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INTRODUCTION
Female genital mutilation (FGM), the practice of cutting or oth-
erwise damaging the genitalia of young women and girls, is a cultural
tradition in some third-world countries.' Although the practice is
widespread in parts of the world, many women and girls participate
unwillingly. After all, FGM has severe short- and long-term health
consequences both for the women who undergo it and for their fu-
ture children. Despite the severity of the harm caused by FGM, how-
ever, many women who arrive in the United States seeking asylum on
the basis of FGM have difficulty establishing that they are, in fact,
refugees.
The claims of these asylum applicants usually founder on the pro-
priety of including the applicants within the "particular social group"
category of section 101 (a) (42) of the Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA).2 That section of the Act defines the term "refugee" and re-
quires that a refugee have a well-founded fear of persecution based on
one of five enumerated grounds. 3 Asylum claims based on female
genital mutilation fit most appropriately into the fourth category,
"membership in a particular social group."4 Yet the Board of Immi-
gration Appeals (BIA) and some courts have wavered in allowing FGM
asylum claims pursuant to this category. 5 To be sure, female genital
mutilation does not fit into the category perfectly, especially given the
recent addition of a "social visibility" requirement to the definition of
a "particular social group." But FGM is precisely the type of persecu-
tion against which the "particular social group" category ought to pro-
tect. Indeed, the INA explicitly provides asylum to anyone who has
been forced to "abort a pregnancy or to undergo involuntary steriliza-
tion,"6 two procedures with obvious similarities to FGM. Female geni-
tal mutilation should be a basis for asylum under the social-group
category of section 101 (a) (42) of the INA, despite that category's visi-
bility requirement; indeed, courts and the BIA should abolish the so-
cial-visibility requirement for all asylum cases. Moreover, as with
I See infra text accompanying notes 8-10.
2 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (42) (2006).
3 See infra Part II.
4 INA § 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42).
5 See infra Part III.
6 INA § 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42).
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forced sterilization, the statute should explicitly mention FGM as a
basis for asylum.
Part I of this Note provides an in-depth explanation of the differ-
ent types of FGM and the populations that most commonly practice
FGM. Part II summarizes what the INA generally requires of nonci-
tizens to qualify for asylum in the United States. Additionally, Part II
provides the background of the social-group category, under which
FGM claims often fall. Part III supplies the history of female genital
mutilation as a basis for asylum in the United States. In Part IV, I
argue that FGM should constitute a basis for asylum in the United
States and that, within section 101 (a) (42) of the INA,7 FGM falls most
logically under the social-group category. Part V argues that the visi-
bility requirement of the social-group category should not apply to
claims for asylum on the basis of FGM. Moreover, Part V contends
that adjudicators should abolish the social-visibility requirement alto-
gether. Parts VI and VII identify two other possible avenues of asylum
for victims of FGM. Part VI explores the possible analogy of female
genital mutilation to forced sterilization, which is explicitly mentioned
in the asylum statute. Part VII discusses the possibility of the United
Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment as another path to asylum for
victims of FGM.
I
GENERAL BACKGROUND OF FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION
Female genital mutilation, also called "female genital cutting" or
"female circumcision," 8 refers to the practice of partially or com-
pletely removing external female genitalia or otherwise injuring fe-
male genitalia.9 The procedure has no medical purpose; rather, for
communities in some parts of the world, FGM is a time-honored rit-
ual.10 In fact, women who have themselves experienced FGM often
7 Id.
8 The range of terms for FGM reflects the corresponding range of opinions about
the practice. Proponents of FGM, for example, often call the practice "female circumci-
sion," which is a more clinical, less loaded term. Cf WORLD HEALTH ORG., ELIMINATING
FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION: AN INTERAGENCY STATEMENT 22 (2008), available at http://
whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2008/9789241596442_eng.pdf. Conversely, the term
"mutilation" "emphasizes the gravity of the act." Id. at 3. As I believe that the practice
violates the human rights of women who are involuntarily subjected to it, I use the term
"female genital mutilation" or "FGM." For the terminology used by various international
organizations, see id. at 22.
9 See id. at 1, 4.
10 See FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION: A GUIDE TO LAwS AND POLICIES WORLDWIDE 5
(Anika Rahman & Nahid Toubia eds., 2000) [hereinafter FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION]
(describing the role of FGM as a rite of passage in some communities); WORLD HEALTH
ORG., supra note 8, at 5-6 (explaining that some societies use FGM in coming-of-age ritu-
als, to "raise a girl properly and to prepare her for adulthood and marriage," and that FGM
2010]
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perpetrate the practice. 1 The victims are usually young women or
girls, although some older women also undergo female genital mutila-
tion.12 The World Health Organization (WHO) estimates that three
million girls are at risk of undergoing FGM procedures each year and
that between 100 and 140 million women have already experienced
FGM.13 Despite its prevalence, female genital mutilation "has no
known health benefits."'1 4 Rather, the procedure, which is typically
"performed without anesthetic by a layperson," 15 is painful and causes
long-term negative health consequences.1 6
The WHO divides female genital mutilation into four different
types. 17 Type I, a "clitoridectomy," involves the "[p]artial or total re-
moval of the clitoris and/or the prepuce."' 8 Type II, "excision," is the
"[p] artial or total removal of the clitoris and the labia minora, with or
without excision of the labia majora."'19 Type III, "infibulation," is the
"[n]arrowing of the vaginal orifice with [the] creation of a covering
seal by cutting and appositioning the labia minora and/or the labia
majora, with or without excision of the clitoris. '20 Finally, Type IV
includes "[a]ll other harmful procedures to the female genitalia for
non-medical purposes, for example: pricking, piercing, incising,
scraping[,] ... cauterization, ' 21 and "stretching or burning of the cli-
toris and/or surrounding tissues. ' 22 In addition, FGM often includes
"sewing shut [the victim's] vaginal opening so that only a small hole
remains through which urine and menstrual fluid may pass." 23
is so firmly a part of the social structure that some girls "may desire to undergo the proce-
dure as a result of social pressure from peers"); see also Howard W. French, The Ritual:
Disfiguring, Hurtful, Wildly Festive, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 1997, at A4.
11 See FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION, supra note 10, at 3; Pamela Constable, Area Immi-
grants with Wounds that Won't Heal: Mutilated Women Seek Asylum in U.S., WASH. POST, Nov. 3,
2008, at B1.
12 See WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 8, at 4 ("Female genital mutilation is mostly
carried out on girls between the ages of 0 and 15 years. However, occasionally, adult and
married women are also subjected to the procedure.").
13 Id. atl.
14 Id.
15 Doriane Lambelet Coleman, Individualizing Justice Through Multiculturalism: The Lib-
erals'Dilemma, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 1093, 1111 (1996).
16 WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 8, at 1, 4, 11 (noting, for example, that "babies
born to women who have undergone female genital mutilation suffer a higher rate of
neonatal death compared with babies born to women who have not undergone the proce-
dure"); see FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION, supra note 10, at 8-9.





22 FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION, supra note 10, at 8. Some definitional difficulty still
exists in this catch-all category. See WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 8, at 28.
23 Coleman, supra note 15.
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Even considering the clearly invasive nature of these procedures,
the number of negative health consequences that female genital muti-
lation causes is staggering. Negative health consequences can result
from any of the four types of FGM, although the first three types are
more likely to produce serious consequences. 24 In the short term, all
four types cause excessive bleeding, severe pain, and emotional
trauma (family or tribe members usually hold a girl down for the pro-
cedure and then bind her legs together for several weeks as she
heals) .25 In addition, all types of FGM can cause shock, difficulty in
urinating, infections (including human immunodeficiency virus
(HIV)), unintended labia fusion, and death. 26 Long-term health con-
sequences often include "chronic pain, infections [to the genitalia],
decreased sexual enjoyment, and psychological consequences, such as
post-traumatic stress disorder."27 Long-term health consequences can
also include keloids (excessive scar tissue), reproductive tract infec-
tions, sexually transmitted infections, HIV, a reduced quality of sexual
life and painful sexual intercourse, a need for later surgery, urinary
and menstrual problems, and infertility.28 Moreover, women who
have suffered FGM Types I, II, and III are more likely to suffer compli-
cations during childbirth, including postpartum hemorrhage and
death of the baby.29 These complications increase for women who do
not give birth in hospitals, an occurrence that is not uncommon in
many of the areas where FGM is practiced. 30
Communities that practice FGM exist mainly in Africa, Asia, and
the Middle East, though some ethnic groups in Central and South
America also practice FGM. 3 1 Thus, noncitizens who arrive in the
United States seeking asylum on the basis of FGM are most likely to
come from these parts of the world.
24 See WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 8, at 11 (noting that the health risks and com-
plications "tend to be significantly more severe and prevalent the more extensive the
procedure").
25 See id.; Constable, supra note 11.
26 See WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 8, at 33.
27 Id. at 11; see also FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION, supra note 10, at 7-9.
28 See WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 8, at 34-35. Some women who have immi-
grated to the United States, France, and other countries have found surgeons who have
been able to reverse some (but not all) of the physical consequences of FGM. See Eve
Conant, The Kindest Cut, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 20, 2009, available at http://www.newsweek.com/
id/218692/page/.
29 See WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 8, at 11 (discussing the dangers that FGM
poses for childbirth).
30 See id.
31 See id. at 4. The WHO also provides a chart of the countries whose populations
practice female genital mutilation and indicates the prevalence of FGM within each coun-




GENERAL BACKGROUND OF ASYLUM LAW AND THE
SOCIAL-GROUP CATEGORY
A. The Definition of "Refugee" and "Persecution"
The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) provides the basis for
asylum law in the United States. The INA defines a "refugee" as
any person who is outside any country of such person's nationality
or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any
country in which such person last habitually resided, and who is un-
able or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail
himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of per-
secution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or po-
litical opinion .... 32
As this definition makes clear, to qualify for asylum in the United
States, a noncitizen must demonstrate persecution on the basis of at
least one of five enumerated grounds: race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.33 The
INA, however, does not define "persecution." As a result, courts have
developed a fact-dependent meaning of the term. 34 It is clear that the
harm to the asylum applicant must be severe to constitute persecu-
tion. As the Seventh Circuit has explained, "the conduct at issue must
rise above the level of mere harassment,"3 5 and "unpleasant and even
dangerous conditions do not necessarily rise to the level of persecu-
tion. '36 Not all bad acts, therefore, constitute persecution.37
An applicant may also demonstrate a well-founded fear of future
persecution to qualify for asylum. 38 This standard has both subjective
and objective components. 39 To satisfy the subjective component, the
applicant's fear must be genuine. 40 The objective component re-
32 INA § 101 (a) (42), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2006).
33 See id.
34 See 3 CHARLES GORDON ET AL., IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 33.04[2] (2008).
35 Prela v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 515, 518 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing Asani v. INS, 154 F.3d
719, 723 (7th Cir. 1998)).
36 Mitev v. INS, 67 F.3d 1325, 1331 (7th Cir. 1995).
37 See Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1243 (3d Cir. 1993) ("'[P]ersecution' is an extreme
concept that does not include every sort of treatment our society regards as offensive.").
38 See INA § 101(a) (42), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (42).
39 See Dobrican v. INS, 77 F.3d 164, 167 (7th Cir. 1996) ("To show a 'well founded
fear' a petitioner must demonstrate both that the fear is (subjectively) genuine and that it
is reasonable in light of the (objective) credible evidence." (citations omitted)); Castillo v.
INS, 951 F.2d 1117, 1121 (9th Cir. 1991) ("The determination that an alien has a well-
founded fear of persecution has both an objective and subjective component." (citations
omitted)).
40 See Castillo, 951 F.2d at 1121 ("The subjective component requires a showing that
the alien's fear is genuine.").
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quires the applicant's fear to be reasonable. 41 An applicant must
demonstrate that the fear is reasonable with "credible, direct, and spe-
cific evidence in the record."42 To meet this standard, an applicant
must show that his or her persecutor has both the capability and incli-
nation to punish the applicant for a characteristic or belief that the
persecutor knows the applicant to have. 43 The applicant may provide
either specific evidence of the applicant's personal experience with
persecutors, or, in some cases, more general evidence that persecutors
target people who are similarly situated to the applicant. 44
An applicant who can demonstrate past persecution will pre-
sumptively have a well-founded fear of future persecution. 45 The gov-
ernment can rebut that presumption either by providing evidence
that the applicant could safely relocate within the applicant's own
country46 or by showing that "conditions in the applicant's country of
nationality or last habitual residence have changed to such an extent
that the applicant no longer has a well-founded fear of being
persecuted." 47
If the applicant fails to show either past persecution or a well-
founded fear of future persecution, humanitarian asylum represents
the applicant's last opportunity to enter the United States as a refu-
gee. Under humanitarian asylum, an adjudicator may discretionarily
grant asylum if
[t] he applicant has demonstrated compelling reasons for being un-
willing or unable to return to the country arising out of the severity
of the past persecution; or... [tihe applicant has established that
there is a reasonable possibility that he or she may suffer other seri-
ous harm upon removal to that country.48
As noted, an asylum applicant must show that his or her persecu-
tors targeted or will target the applicant "on account of' at least one
41 See id.
42 Diaz-Escobar v. INS, 782 F.2d 1488, 1492 (9th Cir. 1986).
43 See GORDON ET AL., supra note 34, § 33.04[2] [a] [ii].
44 See 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.13(b)(2)(iii), 1208.12(b)(2)(iii) (2009); Ndom v. Ashcroft, 384
F.3d 743, 754 (9th Cir. 2004) ("[W]e are ... more likely to find that particular instances of
past persecution experienced by an applicant were inflicted on account of a protected
ground where similar acts are regularly experienced by others who share the applicant's
protected affiliation." (citations omitted)).
45 See GORDON ET AL., supra note 34, § 33.04[2] [b] [i].
46 See8 C.F.R. §§ 208.13(b) (1) (i) (B), 1208.13(b)(1)(i)(B) (allowing an immigration
judge to deny an asylum application if the government can show by a preponderance of
the evidence that "[t] he applicant could avoid future persecution by relocating to another
part of the applicant's country of nationality or, if stateless, another part of the applicant's
country of last habitual residence, and under all the circumstances, it would be reasonable
to expect the applicant to do so").
47 In re H-, 21 1. & N. Dec. 337, 346 (B.I.A. 1996).
48 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.13(b)(1)(iii), 1208.13(b) (1)(iii).
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of five enumerated grounds.49 Those grounds are race, religion, na-
tionality, membership in a particular social group, and political opin-
ion.50 For persecution to be "on account of" one of these grounds,
the ground must be "at least one central reason for persecuting the
applicant."5 1 The persecutor need not have acted with malice, how-
ever. As in many FGM cases, the persecutor may have acted in con-
formity with social tradition or in the belief that the persecutor was
helping the asylum applicant.52 On the other hand, the asylum appli-
cant must show that "the persecutor is aware or could easily become
aware of the [applicant's] protected status or beliefs." 53
B. The "Particular Social Group" Category
Membership in a particular social group is the most appropriate
and most common category for applicants seeking asylum based on
female genital mutilation. Like the term "persecution," the INA does
not define "particular social group." Thus, courts have been largely
responsible for defining the term. The exact definition differs from
circuit to circuit.54
Essentially, a particular social group is "a group of persons all of
whom share a common, immutable characteristic. '55 A characteristic
is immutable if "members of the group either cannot change [the
characteristic], or should not be required to change [it] because it is
fundamental to their individual identities or consciences. '56 An im-
mutable characteristic can be "innate or experiential."57 Innate char-
acteristics are those traits with which the applicant was born, like
"gender,... kinship units such as clans,... or individual family mem-
bership. '58 An experiential immutable characteristic is one that "re-
flect[s] a shared experience, such as past membership in a military or
paramilitary force. '59
In addition, the BIA and most circuit courts recognize a "social
visibility" requirement as part of the meaning of "particular social
49 See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
50 INA § 101 (a)(42), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(42) (2006).
51 REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, § 101 (a) (3) (B) (i), 119 Stat. 302, 302-03.
52 See In re Kasinga, 21 1. & N. Dec. 357, 365 (B.I.A. 1996) (noting that the persecu-
tor's "subjective 'punitive' or 'malignant' intent is not required for harm to constitute
persecution").
53 GORDON ET AL., supra note 34, § 33.04[3] (citing Eduard v. Ashcroft, 379 F.3d 182,
192-93 (5th Cir. 2004)).
54 See id. § 33.04[4] [c] [i].
55 In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985).
56 Id.
57 GORDON ET AL., supra note 34, § 33.04[4] [c] [i].
58 Da Silva v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2005) (citations omitted).
59 Id. (citations omitted).
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group. ' 60 As the courts apply the term, "social visibility" measures the
"extent to which members of the purported group would be recogniz-
able to others" in the community. 61
Finally, some courts have balked at defining any particular social
group too broadly.6 2 Even if a court is willing to define a social group
broadly, an individual applicant may face a higher burden of proof in
showing that he or she has a well-founded fear of persecution. 63 For
example, applicants have sometimes had trouble defining a social
group based on gender only.64 Finally, persecution alone does not
constitute a social group. 65
III
HISTORY OF FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION AS A BASIS
FOR ASYLUM
A. In re Kasinga
The BIA first confronted the issue of FGM as a basis for asylum in
1996 in In re Kasinga.66 The asylum applicant in Kasinga was a
nineteen-year-old citizen of Togo and a member of the Tchamba-Kun-
suntu tribe. 67 Although members of the Tchamba-Kunsuntu tribe
usually subject fifteen-year-old women to FGM, the applicant was not a
victim of FGM because her influential father opposed the practice. 68
After her father died, the applicant fled Togo because her remaining
family intended to subject her to FGM. 69 The BIA held that the appli-
cant had a "well-founded fear of persecution in the form of FGM if
60 See In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 959 (B.I.A. 2006), affd sub nom. Castillo-Arias v.
U.S. Att'y Gen., 446 F.3d 1190 (llth Cir. 2006); see also In reA-M-E- &J-G-U-, 24 1. & N. Dec.
69, 74-75 (B.I.A. 2007) (holding that "affluent Guatemalans" are not members of a partic-
ular social group because they lack visibility as a group).
61 In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 959.
62 See, e.g., Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1577 (9th Cir. 1986) ("Major seg-
ments of the population of an embattled nation, even though undoubtedly at some risk
from general political violence, will rarely, if ever, constitute a distinct 'social group' for
the purposes of establishing refugee status. To hold otherwise would be tantamount to
extending refugee status to every alien displaced by general conditions of unrest or vio-
lence in his or her home country.").
63 See Hong Ying Gao v. Gonzales, 440 F.3d 62, 70 (2d Cir. 2006).
64 See, e.g., Fisher v. INS, 79 F.3d 955, 963 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that because the
applicant had "demonstrated only discrimination on account of her sex," she was not eligi-
ble for relief). But see Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1241 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that "Ira-
nian women who refuse to conform to the government's gender-specific laws and social
norms" may constitute a particular social group (emphasis omitted)).
65 See Lukwago v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 157, 172 (3d Cir. 2003) ("[A] 'particular social
group' must exist independently of the persecution suffered by the applicant for asylum.").
66 21 1. & N. Dec. 357 (B.I.A. 1996).




returned to Togo" and granted her asylum. 70 In reaching its holding,
the BIA defined the applicant's social group as the group "consisting
of young women of the Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe who have not had
FGM, as practiced by that tribe, and who oppose the practice."'71 The
BIA concluded that both being a young woman and being a member
of the Tchamba-Kunsuntu tribe were immutable characteristics. 72
Further, "l[t] he characteristic of having intact genitalia is one that is so
fundamental to the individual identity of a young woman that she
should not be required to change it.' '7 3 Although the BIA came down
squarely in favor of granting asylum on the basis of FGM, the Board
took pains to note that it would not "speculate on, or establish rules
for, [FGM] cases that [were] not before [it]. 74
B. Developments in the Law
Since Kasinga, courts analyzing asylum claims under the social-
group category have looked favorably upon applicants' claims for asy-
lum based on FGM. In Niang v. Gonzales,75 for example, the Tenth
Circuit reasoned that "female members of a tribe would be a social
group" because " [b] oth gender and tribal membership are immutable
characteristics. '76 In contrast to Kasinga, however, the Tenth Circuit
reasoned that there was no need for a social-group definition to in-
clude more than gender and tribal membership (that is, there was no
need to include opposition to FGM). 77
The Ninth Circuit further paved the way for future asylum claims
based on FGM in Mohammed v. Gonzales.78 In that case, the court held
that women who have undergone FGM in the past are eligible for asy-
lum even without a further showing of a well-founded fear of future
persecution. 79 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that FGM, "like forced
sterilization, is a 'permanent and continuing' act of persecution,
which cannot constitute a change in circumstances sufficient to rebut
the presumption of a well-founded fear" of persecution.80 Other cir-
70 Id. at 368.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 366 ("[T] he particular social group is defined by common characteristics that
members of the group either cannot change, or should not be required to change because
such characteristics are fundamental to their individual identities.").
73 Id.
74 Id. at 358.
75 422 F.3d 1187 (10th Cir. 2005).
76 Id. at 1199.
77 See id. at 1200 (finding it noteworthy that "Kasinga's explanation provides no reason
why more than gender or tribal membership would be required to identify a social group,"
although including opposition to FGM as part of the definition would not harm the appli-
cant's claim).
78 400 F.3d 785 (9th Cir. 2005).
79 See id. at 800.
80 Id.
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cuits, however, still allow the government to rebut the presumption of
a well-founded fear of persecution.' l
C. Recent Cases
In September 2007, the BIA decided another FGM asylum case,
In re A-T-.82 The Board's holding conflicted with the Ninth Circuit's
decision in Mohammed v. Gonzales. In In re A-T-, the respondent, a
twenty-eight-year-old woman from Mali, had undergone FGM as a
child but had no memory of the experience. 83 The Board distin-
guished the respondent from the applicant in Kasinga because in Kas-
inga the applicant had not yet undergone FGM. 84 Therefore, the BIA
held that because "FGM is generally performed only once," the re-
spondent could not have a well-founded fear of future persecution.8 5
The respondent had also attempted to analogize FGM to forced steril-
ization,86 which the INA specifically lists as a basis for asylum. 87 Al-
though the BIA recognized the similarities between forced
sterilization and FGM,88 the Board nevertheless reasoned that FGM
was not a basis for asylum because Congress specifically included
forced sterilization, but not FGM, in the statutory definition of the
term "refugee."8 9
81 See, e.g., Niang v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 1187, 1202 (10th Cir. 2005) ("Once one dis-
credits... the threats of future harm. . . one could rationally decide that she had failed to
show that if she returned . . . she would be killed or otherwise subjected to torture.");
Oforji v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 609, 613 (7th Cir. 2003) (noting that an asylum applicant can
show that she has "suffered past persecution on account of one of the enumerated catego-
ries, creating a rebuttable presumption of future persecution"); Seifu v. Ashcroft, 80 F.
App'x. 323, 323-24 (5th Cir. 2003) (noting that the act of FGM is "the very fundamental
change required to rebut the presumption of persecution created by the showing of past
persecution").
82 24 I. & N. Dec. 296 (B.I.A. 2007), vacated, 24 I. & N. Dec. 617 (Op. Att'y Gen.
2008).
83 Id. at 296.
84 See id. at 299.
85 Id.
86 See id. at 299-300. The BIA had previously held that forced sterilization was a form
of continuing persecution. See In reY-T-L-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 601 (B.I.A. 2003).
87 SeeINA § 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2006) ("For purposes of determina-
tions under this chapter, a person who has been forced... to undergo involuntary sterili-
zation, or who has been persecuted for failure or refusal to undergo such a procedure...,
shall be deemed to have been persecuted on account of political opinion, and a person
who has a well founded fear that he or she will be forced to undergo such a procedure or
subject to persecution for such failure, refusal, or resistance shall be deemed to have a well
founded fear of persecution on account of political opinion.").
88 See In re A-T-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 300 ("FGM is similar to forced sterilization in the
sense that it is a harm that is normally performed only once but has ongoing physical and
emotional effects .... ").
89 See id. ("Congress has not seen fit to recognize FGM ... in similar fashion with
special statutory provisions.").
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In June 2008, the Second Circuit reached a very different conclu-
sion in an FGM case. In Bah v. Mukasey,90 the Second Circuit held
that the BIA had erred in In re A-T- when it assumed "categorically"
that a woman could undergo FGM only once.91 Rather, the court
said, the government has the burden of proving in each case that the
specific applicant is not in danger of suffering FGM again. 92 Further,
the BIA erred by requiring that the applicant fear repetition of the
identical harm (FGM) that the applicant originally experienced. 93 In-
deed, the court found that members of the applicant's particular so-
cial group commonly suffered many types of harm. 94
Several months after the Second Circuit decided Bah, the Attor-
ney General vacated the BIA's decision in In re A-T-.95 The Attorney
General agreed with the Second Circuit that the BIA had erred in
deciding that a woman could suffer FGM only once and by ignoring
the possibility that a woman who suffered FGM in the past could suffer
a different form of persecution in the future.96 The Attorney General
remanded the case to the BIA to determine whether the regulations
entitle the applicant to a presumption of a well-founded fear of perse-
cution;97 "if so, whether the Government has satisfied or can satisfy its
burden . . . of establishing one of the factors that would rebut the
presumption";98 and whether the applicant's past experience of fe-
male genital mutilation is related to her current fear of a forced
marriage.9 9
IV
FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION SHOULD BE A BAsis
FOR ASyLUM
The current trend toward allowing women to obtain asylum in
the United States on the basis of female genital mutilation is a positive
change in the law. Indeed, the INA's definition of the term "refugee"
should include both women who face FGM and those who have al-
ready suffered it. Unwanted FGM is clearly persecution, and a show-
ing of FGM in the past should create a rebuttable presumption of a
well-founded fear of future persecution.
90 529 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 2008).
91 Id. at 114.
92 See id. (putting "the burden on the government to show that these particular peti-
tioners are not at risk of further mutilation").
93 Id. at 115-16 ("Nothing in the regulation suggests that the future threats to life or
freedom must come in the same form or be the same act as the past persecution.").
94 See id. at 116.
95 24 I. & N. Dec. 617 (Op. Att'y Gen. 2008).
96 See id. at 621-23.
97 See id. at 624; see also 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b) (1)(i) (2009).
98 In re A-T-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 624; see also 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b) (1) (i) (A)-(B), (ii).
99 See In re A-T-, 24 1. & N. Dec. at 624; see also 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(1)(iii).
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First, unwanted female genital mutilation constitutes persecution.
Both the short- and long-term physical and psychological effects of
FGM100 are severe enough to rise to the level of persecution. Moreo-
ver, although some scholars and criminal defense lawyers defend the
practice of FGM on cultural grounds, 1 1 any woman who feared FGM
and did not desire to undergo the practice or who underwent the
practice against her desires-that is, any woman who rejected a cul-
tural acceptance of FGM-should have a valid claim of persecution.
In addition, both the Second Circuit's decision in Bah v. Mukasey102
and the Attorney General's decision in In re A-T - 03 were correct in
asserting that a showing of past FGM creates a rebuttable presumption
of a well-founded fear of future persecution. 10 4 In fact, some women
undergo female genital mutilation multiple times. 105 Furthermore,
many communities justify FGM as a means of controlling women's sex-
uality, either to insure that women remain virgins until marriage or to
reduce women's sexual desires.10 6 Such ajustification is a violation of
women's human rights. 10 7 Although not every human rights violation
constitutes persecution for asylum purposes, the severe physical and
psychological harm that FGM causes makes it persecution. Indeed,
courts have recognized the existence of persecution in cases involving
much less severe physical harm10 8 or even in the absence of physical
harm.09
100 See supra Part I.
10 See, e.g., Katherine Brennan, The Influence of Cultural Relativism on International
Human Rights Law: Female Circumcision as a Case Study, 7 LAW & INEQUALITY 367, 396 (1989)
("If all cultures are equally valid, on what authority can the human rights system evaluate
these practices?").
102 529 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 2008).
103 24 I. & N. Dec. 617 (Op. Att'y Gen. 2008).
104 See supra text accompanying notes 90-99.
105 See In re A-T-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 621 (referring to a case in which the BIA granted
humanitarian asylum to "two women who had suffered female genital mutilation multiple
times" (citing In re S-A-K- & H-A-H-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 464, 465 (B.I.A. 2008))); U.S. DEP'T OF
STATE, PREVALENCE OF THE PRACTICE OF FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION (FGM); LAws PROHIB-
ITING FGM AND THEIR ENFORCEMENT; RECOMMENDATIONS ON HOW TO BEST WORK TO ELIMI-
NATE FGM 6 (2001), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/9424.pdf
(explaining that in the communities that practice the infibulation type of FGM,
"[r] einfibulation must be performed each time a child is born" and on a woman's wedding
night).
106 See FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION, supra note 10, at 5.
107 See id. at 20-39.
108 See, e.g., Beskovic v. Gonzales, 467 F.3d 223 (2d Cir. 2006) ("[A] 'minor beating'
or ... any physical degradation designed to cause pain, humiliation, or other suffering,
may rise to the level of persecution if it occurred in the context of an arrest or detention
on the basis of a protected ground." (citation omitted)).
109 See, e.g., Makhoul v. Ashcroft, 387 F.3d 75, 80 (Ist Cir. 2004) ("As a theoretical
matter, we acknowledge that, under the right set of circumstances, a finding of past perse-
cution might rest on a showing of psychological harm." (citations omitted)); Kovac v. INS,
407 F.2d 102, 104, 106-07 (9th Cir. 1969) (reasoning that the asylum applicant's inability
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Because FGM is plainly persecution, women who have a well-
founded fear of FGM should be eligible for asylum in the United
States under the INA on the basis of membership in a particular social
group. 110 As most recent case law on FGM demonstrates, asylum ap-
plications based on a well-founded fear of FGM fit most logically into
the social-group category. An applicant has never asserted that she
suffered FGM on the basis of her race, her nationality, or her religion.
Further, although an applicant may be able to show that her persecu-
tors subjected her to FGM on the basis of her political opinion, in
most cases, applicants will be most successful applying the particular-
social-group category to FGM asylum claims.
Women who fear female genital mutilation generally meet the
criteria for membership in a particular social group. In communities
where FGM is prevalent, persecutors target women who have not un-
dergone FGM. In addition, the characteristic of fearing FGM (or,
analogously, the desire not to undergo FGM) is likely to be immutable
among most women. Even if it is possible to change a woman's atti-
tude toward FGM, no woman should be forced to change this charac-
teristic or belief-that is, women "should not be required to change
[this characteristic] because it is fundamental to their individual iden-
tities or consciences.' ' l
Moreover, women who have already suffered FGM will also fit
most of the criteria for membership in a particular social group. In
some cultures, persecutors target these women for repeated FGM.112
Even if a particular community did not subject women to multiple
experiences of FGM, a showing of past persecution and enduring
physical and emotional harm should be sufficient for such women to
obtain asylum. For those women who have already suffered FGM, the
immutable characteristic is experiential,' 13 rooted in their experience
of having undergone FGM. Within the social-group category, how-
ever, asylum claims would probably be less successful if the group were
defined as women in general, as decision makers have been reluctant
to acknowledge a particular social group if it is too broad.114
In the cases of both women who have already undergone female
genital mutilation and those who have not, the visibility require-
ment"1 5 of the social-group category presents a problem. Another
person will not immediately know whether a woman has undergone
to "earn a decent living to support [his] family" because of discrimination may constitute
persecution sufficient for asylum (internal quotation marks omitted)).
110 SeeINA § 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2006).
111 See supra text accompanying note 56.
112 See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
113 See supra text accompanying notes 56-59.
114 See supra text accompanying notes 62-65.
115 See supra text accompanying notes 60-61.
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FGM or whether she fears FGM. How should courts handle this ele-
ment of the definition of a particular social group? The next Part
discusses this issue.
V
THE VISIBILITY REQUIREMENT SHOULD NOT APPLY TO
FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION
A. History of Including the Visibility Requirement in the
Definition of a Particular Social Group
The Second Circuit originated the visibility requirement of the
"particular social group" category. In 1991, in Gomez v. INS,' 16 the
court held that the applicant's asserted social group, "women who
have been previously battered and raped by Salvadoran guerillas,"'117
did not constitute a particular social group under the INA because
"would-be persecutors could [not] identify [the women] as members
of the purported group"-that is, it was not possible for the persecu-
tors to target members of the alleged group for persecution.1 1 8 The
Second Circuit retained the visibility requirement in Gao v. Gonza-
les, 1 19 requiring a particular social group to "share[ ] a ... characteris-
tic that is identifiable to would-be persecutors and is immutable or
fundamental. '"1 20
The BIA approved the Second Circuit's new "social visibility" re-
quirement in In re C-A-.12 1 In that case, the BIA explained that the
"recognizability" of a social group depended on its visibility to others
in a society.122 In laying out the social-visibility requirement, the BIA
relied on guidelines issued by the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR) for understanding the social-group category
under international law. 12 3 The UNHCR Guidelines define a particu-
lar social group as:
[A] group of persons who share a common characteristic other
than their risk of being persecuted, or who are perceived as a group
by society. The characteristic will often be one which is innate, un-
116 947 F.2d 660 (2d Cir. 1991).
117 Id. at 663-64.
118 Id. at 664.
119 440 F.3d 62 (2d Cir. 2006), vacated, Keisler v. Hong Yin Gao, 128 S. Ct. 345 (2007).
120 Id. at 64.
121 23 I. & N. Dec. 951 (B.I.A. 2006).
122 See id. at 959-60.
123 See id. at 956. See generally UNHCR, Guidelines on International Protection: "Membership
of a Particular Social Group" Within the Context of Article JA(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or Its
1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 10-23, U.N. Doc. HCR/GIP/02/02 (May 7,
2002) [hereinafter UNHCR Guidelines], available at http://www.unhcr.org/3d58de2da.




changeable, or which is otherwise fundamental to identity, con-
science or the exercise of one's human rights.
1 24
As the BIA noted, this definition also incorporates the social-visibility
requirement into the definition of social-group membership. 12 5 The
Guidelines also state, and the BIA emphasizes, that the social-group
category is not a "catch all" category for every individual who faces
persecution. 126
Although the UNHCR Guidelines use the phrase "perceived as a
group by society" rather than the "socially visible" language, 127 in In re
C-A-, the BIA interpreted the two formulations in the same way. 128
The use of the word "social" before "visibility" allows courts and the
BIA to avoid requiring a strict "visibility" standard. As long as society
perceives individuals as part of the group, group members need not
physically differ from others in society.
B. The Cases in Which the Visibility Requirement Defeats the
Asylum Claim Differ Substantively from Female Genital
Mutilation Claims
Noncitizens' asylum applications based on the social-group cate-
gory often fail, both before the BIA and courts, because their alleged
social groups lack social visibility. For example, in In re A-M-E- &J-G-
U, 1 29 the BIA denied asylum to a group of noncitizens who claimed
they were a part of the social group of "affluent Guatemalans."'1 30
Wealthy Guatemalans are not visible, according to the BIA, because
"violence and crime in Guatemala [are] ... pervasive at all socio-eco-
nomic levels" and persecutors also victimized less wealthy
Guatemalans.13 1 In Santos-Lemus v. Mukasey, 13 2 the Ninth Circuit also
rejected an asylum claim based on the social-group category of "young
men in El Salvador resisting gang violence," reasoning that the alleged
group did not qualify because of its lack of social visibility.1 33 Most
124 UNHCR Guidelines, supra note 123, 11 (emphasis omitted).
125 See In re G-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 956.
126 See id. at 960; UNCHR Guidelines, supra note 123, 2 ("[A] social group cannot be
defined exclusively by the fact that it is targeted for persecution (although... persecution
may be a relevant element in determining the visibility of a particular social group)." (em-
phasis omitted)).
127 UNHCR Guidelines, supra note 123, 11.
128 See In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 956, 959-60 (claiming that the UNHCR Guidelines
adopted "the Second Circuit's 'social perception' approach" and later referring to this
requirement as "social visibility").
129 24 I. & N. Dec. 69 (B.I.A. 2007), affd sub nom. Ucelo-Gomez v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d
70 (2d Cir. 2007).
130 See id. at 69.
131 Id. at 75.
132 542 F.3d 738 (9th Cir. 2008).
133 Id. at 745; see also Xiang Ming Jiang v. Mukasey, 296 F. App'x 166, 168 (2d Cir.
2008) (holding that "people who are targeted for gang violence because they are caught
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recently, in Davila-Mejia v. Mukasey,134 the Eighth Circuit rejected a
petition for asylum based on the social-group category of "competing
family business owners."'135 The court held that such a status did not
make the applicants sufficiently socially visible such that persecutors
would target the applicants in particular. 136
The visibility requirement for a particular social group is not ap-
propriate in FGM cases for several reasons. First, in the cases that
apply the visibility element to the asylum claim, the opinion usually
justifies the visibility requirement because of the need for persecutors
to perceive, and thus target, members of the alleged group. 37 Yet in
cases in which applicants fear FGM, persecutors have no difficulty per-
ceiving the applicants. In these cases, the applicants are usually young
or about to marry, and they are always female. Moreover, in most
FGM cases, the applicant is part of a tribe or other small community,
and potential persecutors are neighbors and relatives.1 38 Thus, many
potential applicants are known to their persecutors, and identifying
characteristics are unnecessary.1 39
In the cases in which the BIA or courts have denied applicants
asylum based on the visibility requirement of the social-group cate-
gory, the persecution the applicants allege often differs substantively
from female genital mutilation. For example, many of the cases in
which the social group is found to lack social visibility involve claims of
economic persecution, as in In re A-M-E- & J-G-U-40 and Davila-
Mejia.1" Although it is possible for an applicant to obtain asylum on
the basis of economic persecution, decision makers tend to require a
much higher level of harm in such cases. 142 Even in Santos-Lemus v.
between rival criminal gangs but are not protected by police in China" do not constitute a
particular social group for asylum purposes); In re E-A-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 591, 594 (B.I.A.
2008) (holding that the group "persons resistant to gang membership" does not constitute
a particular social group).
134 531 F.3d 624 (8th Cir. 2008).
135 Id. at 629.
136 See id. For other decisions rejecting the applicant's proposed social group, see
Umoeka v. Att'y Gen., 294 F. App'x 736, 739 (3d Cir. 2008) (holding that "perceived police
informants" did not constitute a particular social group); Kholyavskiy v. Mukasey, 540 F.3d
555, 572 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that "the mentally ill" and 'Jewish refugees who resettled
in the United States" are not particular social groups); In reA-T-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 296, 303
(B.I.A. 2007) (expressing doubt that "young Bambara women who oppose arranged mar-
riage have the kind of social visibility that would make them readily identifiable to those
who would be inclined to persecute them" (citation omitted)).
137 See supra Part V.A.
138 See FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION, supra note 10, at 3.
139 See, e.g., In re Kasinga, 21 1. & N. Dec. 357, 358 (B.I.A. 1996) (explaining that, after
her father died, the applicant's relatives wanted to subject her to FGM).
140 See supra notes 129-31 and accompanying text.
141 See supra notes 134-36 and accompanying text.
142 See GORDON ET AL., supra note 34, § 33.04[2] (explaining that "economic disadvan-
tage alone will not suffice" to constitute persecution).
2010]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
Mukasey, 143 the harm of which the applicant complained was "harass-
ment"-the persecutors demanded money from the applicant and
once beat him. 1 44
Indeed, in most social-group-category cases in which the court
holds that the alleged group lacks the visibility element, the court's
unspoken rationale seems to be that another element besides the visi-
bility requirement is missing from the applicant's claim. Most often,
the missing element actually seems to be that the characteristic or be-
lief that forms the social group is not immutable or fundamental
enough. It may seem odd to discuss a characteristic or belief as not
being immutable or fundamental "enough"-indeed, by definition,
the two words are take-it-or-leave-it qualities. For this reason, however,
courts seem to shy away from discussing such applicants' characteris-
tics as not being immutable or fundamental and instead rely on the
visibility requirement to deny claims. For instance, in Santos-Lemus, it
would have been odd-and perhaps even insulting-for the court to
say that resisting gang violence was not an immutable quality for
young men in El Salvador. Yet the language that describes the status,
"resisting," implies that some people stop resisting. Moreover, it
would be unreasonable for the court to suggest that individuals in
such a group should change such a characteristic or belief, even if that
characteristic or belief is not fundamental to the individuals'
identities.
Indeed, in In re A-M-E- &J-G-U-, the BIA admitted that wealth as a
characteristic of a social group was not immutable. 145 But, the BIA
continued, "the shared characteristic is so fundamental to identity or
conscience that it should not be expected to be changed."' 46 The BIA
recognized that it could not expect the applicants to change their
shared characteristic (that is, to divest themselves of their wealth) 147
and thus denied asylum based on lack of visibility.148 The BIA was
explicit that it could not decide In re A-M-E- &J-G-U- on the basis that
the applicants could simply change their characteristic. 49 That it
would be unreasonable for an adjudicator to ask an asylum applicant
to change a characteristic or belief, however, does not make that char-
acteristic or belief fundamental to the applicant's identity. In prac-
tice, it is rarely easy to choose asylum applicants to turn away from the
United States. But one way to make such line drawing easier would be
143 See supra notes 132-33 and accompanying text.
144 See 542 F.3d 738, 746 (9th Cir. 2008).
145 See 24 I. & N. Dec. 69, 73 (B.I.A. 2007).
146 Id.
147 See id. at 73-74.
148 See id. at 74-75.
149 Id. at 73-74 ("In this regard, we would not expect divestiture when considering
wealth as a characteristic on which a social group might be based.").
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to recognize that there are many characteristics that individuals
should not have to change that are not necessarily fundamental to
those individuals' identities.
The pattern of these social-group-category cases, combined with
FGM cases, suggests that courts and the BIA should abolish the social-
visibility requirement. In asylum cases in which adjudicators rely on
the visibility requirement as the key issue, courts and the BIA could
instead simply weigh the strength of the applicant's characteristic or
belief that is the basis for the social-group-category claim. Admittedly,
this balancing would not be an easy bright-line rule for adjudicators to
apply, but such balancing would not be less clear than the current
social-visibility requirement. And the change would allow courts and
the BIA to judge asylum cases with an eye to fundamental fairness. In
prioritizing different applicants' characteristics or beliefs, adjudicators
might use as a guideline whether the characteristic or belief is innate
or immutable, or merely learned or adopted. Under this scheme,
wealth is not immutable-even absent the intervention of a persecu-
tor (or a court, for that matter), no one is ever guaranteed eternal
wealth. Conversely, the experience and symptoms of having been
genitally mutilated are immutable.
Eliminating the social-visibility requirement would not change
the outcome of cases like In re A-M-E- & J-GU -1 50 or Davila-Mejia;151
indeed, those cases could even form the basis of a justification for
abolishing the requirement. In such cases, the court or the BIA would
reach the same outcomes by explaining the relative importance to an
individual of characteristics like affluence or ownership of a family
business as compared to characteristics like gender or a shared, past
traumatic experience. In addition, other claims of persecution on the
basis of legitimate social groups, like those of applicants who fear or
who have undergone FGM, would not falter on the social-visibility re-
quirement. Importantly, courts and the BIA would be explicit about
the bases for their determinations of asylum, thereby making a com-
plicated and at times bewildering process more transparent to nonci-
tizens, lawyers, and government officials.
VI
OTHER AVENUES FOR ESTABLISHING ASYLUM BASED ON
FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION: ANALOGY TO
INVOLUNTARY STERILIZATION
Even if courts and the BIA do not abolish the social-visibility re-
quirement of the social-group category of the INA entirely or just for
150 See supra notes 129-31, 146-49 and accompanying text.
151 See supra notes 134-36 and accompanying text.
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FGM, asylum applicants may still be able to reliably establish asylum
on the basis of FGM in another way. The INA explicitly includes
forced sterilization as a basis for asylum:
For purposes of determinations under this chapter, a person who
has been forced to abort a pregnancy or to undergo involuntary
sterilization, or who has been persecuted for failure or refusal to
undergo such a procedure or for other resistance to a coercive pop-
ulation control program, shall be deemed to have been persecuted
on account of political opinion, and a person who has a well
founded fear that he or she will be forced to undergo such a proce-
dure or subject to persecution for such failure, refusal, or resistance
shall be deemed to have a well founded fear of persecution on ac-
count of political opinion. 15 2
The INA thus categorizes forced sterilization as persecution on ac-
count of political opinion, not membership in a particular social
group. Therefore, asylum applicants who hope to gain admission to
the United States on the basis of a fear of FGM may be able to analo-
gize it to involuntary sterilization and thereby avoid the social-visibil-
ity-requirement problem.
A. History of Involuntary Sterilization as a Basis for Asylum
One of the earliest cases in which the BIA explicitly recognized
involuntary sterilization as persecution was In re Y-T-L-. 153 In that case,
the Chinese applicant and his wife had three children, despite the
Chinese law prohibiting couples from having more than one child. 154
After the illegal birth of the second child, the Chinese government
fined the applicant and his wife. 155 After the illegal birth of the
couple's third child, the Chinese government forcibly sterilized the
applicant's wife. 156 In its decision, the BIA reasoned that forced steril-
ization constitutes persecution because the practice deprives an indi-
vidual of the ability to have children. 15 7 Importantly, the BIA also
declined to hold that an asylum applicant's past sterilization could es-
tablish a "fundamental change in circumstances" sufficient to discre-
tionarily deny asylum merely because the applicant faced no further
threat of forced sterilization. 158 Moreover, the passage of time since a
152 INA § 101(a) (42), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (42) (2006).
153 23 I. & N. Dec. 601 (B.1.A. 2003). In its decision, the BIA relied on an earlier case,
In re G-Y-Z-, 21 1. & N. Dec. 915 (B.I.A. 1997).
154 See In re Y-T-L-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 602.
155 See id.
156 See id.
157 See id. at 607.
158 See id. at 605-07.
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forced sterilization will not change the fact that an individual who has
been forcibly sterilized has a well-founded fear of persecution. 159
The Ninth Circuit agreed with the BIA's holding in In re Y-T-L-
and extended the applicability of the Board's reasoning. In Qili Qu v.
Gonzales,160 Chinese authorities denied the asylum applicant and his
wife a birth permit because of their political beliefs. 16 1 When the ap-
plicant's wife became pregnant, the couple hid their child with his
grandparents. 162 The couple finally received a birth permit four years
after they had applied for one, and they attempted to apply the permit
to the child who had already been born by pretending that the child
was younger than he was. 163 When authorities discovered the ruse, a
neighborhood committee forcibly sterilized the applicant's wife.1
6 4
The Ninth Circuit held that when the Chinese government involunta-
rily sterilized the applicant's wife, the harm constituted "permanent
and continuing persecution." 165 The court further held that, unlike
in ordinary asylum cases, the U.S. government could never rebut the
presumption of persecution in such cases. 166 The Ninth Circuit rea-
soned that, because the persecution was ongoing, it was not possible
for conditions to change or for the applicant to relocate such that he
could eliminate his well-founded fear of persecution.
16 7
B. History of Analogizing Female Genital Mutilation to
Involuntary Sterilization
Following In re Y-T-L-, Qili Qu, and similar cases, some asylum ap-
plicants who had suffered female genital mutilation attempted to anal-
ogize FGM to forced sterilization. The correlation between the two
practices was obvious: FGM and involuntary sterilization have similar
types of physical and emotional harm and similar long-term effects.
The first case in which the applicant drew a comparison between fe-
male genital mutilation and involuntary sterilization was Mohammed v.
Gonzales.168 There, the analogy succeeded. The Ninth Circuit held
that female "genital mutilation, like forced sterilization, is a 'perma-
nent and continuing' act of persecution, which cannot constitute a
change in circumstances sufficient to rebut the presumption of a well-
founded fear."' 169
159 See id. at 605-08.
160 399 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir. 2005).




165 Id. at 1203.
166 See id. at 1202-03.
167 See id. at 1203.
168 400 F.3d 785 (9th Cir. 2005). See generally supra text accompanying notes 78-80.
169 400 F.3d at 800.
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Other circuits, however, were unwilling to accept the analogy to
involuntary sterilization with such ease, and many applicants who ap-
plied for asylum on the basis of FGM did not enjoy the same success.
All subsequent cases in which an applicant analogized FGM to forced
sterilization either distinguished Mohammed or explicitly disagreed
with the Ninth Circuit. For example, in the original decision of the
BIA in In re A-T-, 70 the BIA disagreed with the continuing-harm analy-
sis of the Ninth Circuit in Mohammed.171 The BIA noted that the INA
does not explicitly include FGM as a basis for asylum.' 72 Moreover,
the Board explained that FGM was like any other past injury that rises
to the level of persecution, "including those that involve some lasting
disability, such as the loss of a limb."173
The Sixth Circuit came to a similar conclusion in Diallo v.
Mukasey.174 In Diallo, the asylum applicant claimed to have a well-
founded fear of persecution on account of her political activities; she
had also undergone FGM as a child.17 5 In rejecting her claim for asy-
lum, the Sixth Circuit distinguished Mohammed: "The soundness of the
decision in Mohammed, however, is debatable because Congress specif-
ically defined the term 'refugee' to include victims of forced steriliza-
tion. No equivalent 'shortcut' to refugee status applies to those
subjected to FGM."'176 The court also distinguished Mohammed on the
facts: in Mohammed, the petitioner might have been at risk for further
female genital mutilation, but the applicant in Diallo had identified no
such risk. 177 In making this distinction, the court pointed out that in
Mohammed, the Ninth Circuit had concluded in the alternative that
"even ifFGM were not analogous to forced sterilization, the petitioner might
well have been at risk of further genital mutilation if returned to
Somalia."1 78 Finally, the Sixth Circuit pointed out that the INA explic-
itly includes forced sterilization as a basis for asylum in response to the
coercive family-planning policies of countries like China.179 The Sixth
Circuit did not explain, though, why this intended purpose of includ-
170 24 I. & N. Dec. 296 (B.I.A. 2007). See generally supra text accompanying notes
82-89. Although the Attorney General recently vacated this case, see 24 I. & N. Dec. 617
(Op. Att'y Gen. 2008), In re A-T- represents the BIA's response to an analogy between FGM
and forced sterilization.
171 See In re A-T-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 300.
172 See id.
173 Id.
174 268 F. App'x 373 (6th Cir. 2008).
175 See id. at 374-75.
176 Id. at 380 (citing INA § 101 (a) (42), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (42) (2006); Hassan v. Gon-
zales, 484 F.3d 513, 518 (8th Cir. 2007); In reA-T-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 296).
177 See id.
178 Id. (emphasis added).
179 See id. (citing In re A-T-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 296).
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ing forced sterilization made the analogy to female genital mutilation
inappropriate.
C. Courts Should Accept the Analogy Between Female Genital
Mutilation and Involuntary Sterilization
Despite the inconsistent responses by the BIA and courts to anal-
ogies between forced sterilization and female genital mutilation, asy-
lum applicants should be able to liken the two and thereby receive the
benefits of asylum. Female genital mutilation, like forced sterilization,
has ongoing physical and psychological effects on the individuals who
are involuntarily subjected to it.1a 0 Indeed, one potential effect of
FGM is infertility.'18  Considering this potential health consequence,
FGM is arguably even more physically and emotionally scarring than
involuntary sterilization. Moreover, women who are genitally muti-
lated against their will and individuals who are forcibly sterilized both
suffer a grievous breach of bodily autonomy. 18 2
Admittedly, some problems exist with this approach as an avenue
to asylum for victims of FGM. Historically, with the exception of Mo-
hammed v. Gonzales,183 cases in which asylum applicants analogized
FGM to forced sterilization have not prevailed.' 8 4 Nevertheless, judi-
cial history can be, and frequently is, overcome either by legislation or
acts of the judiciary itself. A second, perhaps more serious, problem
with the analogy between FGM and involuntary sterilization lies in the
definition of each type of persecution. The INA states that forced
sterilization constitutes persecution on account of political opinion,
not membership in a particular social group,'8 5 while FGM fits most
appropriately into the category of membership in a particular social
group.'8 6 Again, however, this difference is not fatal to the analogy
between FGM and involuntary sterilization.
The best solution to this difference in statutory treatment is to
explicitly mention female genital mutilation as a basis for asylum in
the INA, just like involuntary sterilization. Such an addition could be
accomplished easily. The current language of section 101(a) (42) of
the INA could remain, but an additional sentence, analogous to the
current sentence about forced sterilization, should be added at the
end of the section. That sentence might read:
180 See supra notes 24-30 and accompanying text.
181 See supra text accompanying note 28.
182 Cf supra text accompanying note 107.
183 See supra text accompanying notes 168-69.
184 See supra text accompanying notes 170-79.
185 See INA § 101 (a) (42), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2006).
186 See supra Part II.B.
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For purposes of determination under this chapter, a person who
has been forced to undergo involuntary genital mutilation, or who
has been persecuted for failure or refusal to undergo such a proce-
dure, shall be deemed to have been persecuted on account of mem-
bership in a particular social group, and a person who has a well-
founded fear that he or she will be forced to undergo such a proce-
dure or subject to persecution for such failure, refusal, or resistance
shall be deemed to have a well-founded fear of persecution on ac-
count of membership in a particular social group.
The addition of such a sentence would prevent courts or the BIA from
distinguishing FGM and involuntary sterilization on the basis of con-
gressional intent. Indeed, with the inclusion of such a sentence, an
adjudicator would have to make only a factual determination as to a
potential asylee's application-whether or not the applicant had a
well-founded fear of female genital mutilation. Such a statutory
change would thus have the added benefit of alleviating currently
overloaded court dockets.
Until Congress changes the statute, however, courts and the BIA
should still allow asylum applicants to analogize FGM to forced sterili-
zation, and women should be able to secure asylum on the basis of
FGM. In Diallo v. Mukasey,18 7 the Sixth Circuit relied on the legislative
intent to include forced sterilization in the INA.188 The Sixth Circuit
claimed that Congress included involuntary sterilization in the defini-
tion of refugee in the INA directly in response to China's coercive
family-planning policies.1 89 Even if this explanation of the legislative
history of the INA is accurate, a policy or practice of irreparably physi-
cally and psychologically injuring women in a community is just as
despicable as a coercive family-planning policy, and Congress and the
courts should recognize it as such. But until Congress recognizes
FGM as equally harmful as or more harmful than involuntary steriliza-
tion, courts and the BIA should allow applicants to compare the prac-
tices in their bids for asylum.
Moreover, the current difference in the "on account of' catego-
ries for involuntary sterilization and FGM does not affect the underly-
ing analysis. The INA requires only that persecution be on account of
one of the five enumerated grounds. 190 After a ground is identified in
any asylum analysis, that ground does not affect the rest of the asylum
process. Indeed, the same type of harm can be a basis for asylum
under different enumerated grounds. As long as FGM fits into one of
the enumerated categories, it should not be important to courts or
187 268 F. App'x 373 (6th Cir. 2008).
188 See id. at 380 (citing In reA-T-, 24 1. & N. Dec. 296 (B.I.A. 2007)); see also In reY-T-L-,
23 I. & N. Dec. 601 (B.I.A. 2003).
189 See Diallo, 268 F. App'x at 380.
190 See supra Part II.A.
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the BIA whether FGM falls into the same category as involuntary steril-
ization or not.
VII
ANOTHER AVENUE: UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST
TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN OR
DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT
In addition to domestic asylum law, the applicants seeking asylum
on the basis of female genital mutilation may have recourse to the
United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhu-
man or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT).191 Although
CAT is not self-executing in the United States, 192 Congress passed the
Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act in 1998, which imple-
mented Article 3 of CAT.193 Article 3 of CAT provides that state par-
ties to the Convention may not "expel, return ("refoule?') or extradite
a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for be-
lieving that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture." 194
Therefore, an asylum applicant must meet a heavier burden of prov-
ing persecution under CAT, under which the applicant must fear fu-
ture harm, 19 5 than under section 101 (a) (42) of the INA, 196 under
which past harm is sufficient. 197
The Convention Against Torture defines torture as
any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or
mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as
obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession,
punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is
suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or
a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any
kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation
of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other
person acting in an official capacity. 198
Thus, the four elements of torture under CAT are severe physical or
mental pain or suffering; intentional infliction; infliction for the pur-
pose of obtaining information, punishing, intimidating, coercing, "or
191 G.A. Res. 39/46, 39 U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc. A/39/51
(Dec. 10, 1984) [hereinafter CAT].
192 See GORDON ET AL., supra note 34, § 33.10[2].
193 See Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277,
§ 2242, 112 Stat. 2681, 2822.
194 CAT, supra note 191, art. 3.
195 See id. (requiring that an individual must believe "that he would be in danger of
being subjected to torture" (emphasis added)).
196 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2006).
197 See supra text accompanying note 45.
198 CAT, supra note 191, art. 1; see also 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.18(a)(1), 1208.18(a)(1) (2009)
(incorporating CAT's definition of torture).
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for any reason based on discrimination of any kind";199 and "in-
flict[ion] by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquies-
cence of a public official" or someone "acting in an official
capacity."20 0
A. Application to Female Genital Mutilation
Given the extreme physical and psychological harms associated
with female genital mutilation,20 1 an asylum applicant could make a
strong argument that FGM meets the level of severe physical or
mental pain or suffering that the Convention Against Torture re-
quires. Indeed, this element would probably be the least controversial
in any FGM claim under CAT, given that previous FGM cases have
recognized the severity of the suffering that FGM causes to the women
who undergo it. Moreover, this element does not seem to differ sub-
stantially from the (high) level of harm that section 101 (a) (42) of the
INA requires. 20 2
Asylum applicants who have suffered FGM likewise would have no
trouble showing intentional infliction of FGM. Indeed, intentionality
is an integral part of the definition of female genital mutilation. In
any hypothetical situation involving some harm that might be de-
scribed as unintentional female genital mutilation, the woman who
had suffered the harm would not be able to obtain asylum under sec-
tion 101 (a) (42) of the INA, either. In such a situation, the woman
would not be able to show that she had suffered persecution "on ac-
count of" one of the five enumerated grounds2 0 3 because she would
not have suffered FGM on account of anything at all.
The third element of the CAT definition of torture, infliction for
one of the listed purposes, would also pose few problems to asylum
applicants who have suffered FGM. In many cases of FGM, applicants
can show that their persecutors inflicted FGM as a means of control-
ling women's sexuality, 20 4 a purpose that should qualify as intimida-
tion or coercion under CAT. Even in those cases in which asylum
applicants cannot show that their persecutors subjected them to FGM
as a means to control women's sexuality, applicants should have no
difficulty showing that their cases fall into the final category of listed
purposes, "for any reason based on discrimination of any kind."20 5 Af-
ter all, the name of the practice itself-female genital mutilation-
199 CAT, supra note 191, art. 1.
200 Id.
201 See supra notes 24-30 and accompanying text.
202 See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
203 See supra Part H.A.
204 See supra text accompanying note 106.
205 CAT, supra note 191, art. 1.
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makes clear that persecutors subject only women to this type of tor-
ture and that FGM is thus a form of gender discrimination.
The most difficult element of the CAT definition of torture for a
woman who has suffered or fears suffering FGM would most likely be
the fourth element. That element requires that the harm be inflicted
by a public official or someone acting in an official capacity, or at least
that such an official acquiesce to the act. In most FGM cases, the re-
quirement that the "official" acquiesce is not at issue; in the communi-
ties that practice FGM, no one attempts to stop the practice, nor even
to condemn it.206 Rather, the difficulty for a woman who has suffered
FGM would be in showing the "officialness" of the actor or actors.
Because the usual practitioners of female genital mutilation are mem-
bers of the female's community or tribe,20 7 they are not always formal
public officials. Nevertheless, an applicant seeking protection under
CAT could plausibly argue that respected tribal leaders function as
officials of the tribe. Additionally, given that most females who un-
dergo FGM are children and young women, 20 8 such women could ar-
gue that the practitioners of FGM often have an additional age-related
authority over their victims.
CONCLUSION
Asylum law based on the particular-social-group category of sec-
tion 101 (a) (42) of the INA is murky, and the category is difficult for
noncitizens to apply in practice. For this reason, the BIA and the
courts should make clear that an applicant who has suffered or who
fears suffering FGM has a well-founded fear of persecution. Further,
that applicant's asylum claim should not falter with application of the
particular-social-group category. Despite the unwise recent addition
of the visibility requirement to the definition of a social group, women
who have undergone or who fear undergoing FGM are a clear exam-
ple of a social group that deserves protection under U.S. asylum law.
The rationales for the visibility requirement are still fulfilled in cases
of FGM. Persecutors have no difficulty targeting these women; more-
over, the characteristic is either immutable or fundamental, depend-
ing on how it is articulated.
Female genital mutilation cases highlight the ultimate problems
with the social-visibility requirement. Although courts should recog-
nize that women in FGM cases have the requisite social visibility, the
requirement should be abolished for all asylum cases. As long as com-
munities around the world continue to practice FGM, women who
206 Cf supra text accompanying note 10.
207 Cf supra text accompanying note 25.
208 See supra note 12.
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fear or unwillingly undergo the practice should qualify for asylum in
the United States.
The difficulty of applying the social-group category may be
eclipsed altogether by simply adding female genital mutilation to the
INA as an explicit ground for relief. Such an addition would properly
mirror the inclusion of involuntary sterilization as a ground for asy-
lum. Furthermore, it should not matter to the asylum analysis
whether FGM fits under the same enumerated ground as forced steril-
ization because the type of harm is similar.
Until U.S. immigration law functions properly to allow victims of
FGM to obtain asylum, victims may also consider an asylum claim
under the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment. Although the CAT standard, by
requiring fear of future harm, is narrower than the standard for perse-
cution under the INA, women who fear FGM will often have strong
cases under CAT.
Hopefully, one day the path to asylum for victims of female geni-
tal mutilation will not require resort to international law at all. As
long as communities around the world continue to practice FGM, wo-
men who unwillingly undergo the practice should be able to take ref-
uge in the United States.
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